The author looks at terrorism from the perspective of humanity, not of the hegemonic power or the alliance of democratic and anti-democratic regimes under the name of "anti-terrorism", and points out that the structural root causes of "anti-civilizational" terrorism raise the question whether the North, including Japan, is really "civilized".
The article includes the following sections:
Whose anti-terrorism?;
The Political Game of "International Cooperation";
The Rhetoric of "International Anti-terrorism";
The "legality" of the use of force;
Legal requirements for a "New War";
Structural roots of terrorism;
"Civilization" and "justice";
The backlash from South to North;
Diplomacy to show the "Rising Sun";
The case for a "Human Security Corps".

On September 11, 2001, I was in Britain. Shocking pictures were shown day by day. I was particularly frightened by the two that came out in the London Sunday Times, September 16. I stared at them transfixed, but at the same time unable to bear the sight. One was a large photo of a group of about thirty people, leaning out of the windows of what might been near the 100th floor of the World Trade Center and trying to escape from the flames and smoke about to engulf them. The other prominently featured image was of a man who had jumped from a window and was plummeting head first toward the ground beneath.

The pictures of the collapsing World Trade Center were horrifying. But the two images that stay with me most are not ones of buildings, but those of men and women during the final moments of their lives.

I was shocked by the terror since I witnessed it as the death of human beings - the indiscriminate murder of innocent people. To me, it did not matter which country or ethnic group they belonged to. It was plainly the death of human beings.

In contrast, President George W. Bush declared that the deaths resulted from a war against America, and that it was the United States that would win a war on terrorism. Many Americans also saw the September 11 victims exclusively as citizens of their own nation. The Stars and Stripes inundated New York City and elsewhere in the United States.

Here we find a fundamental difference in terms of the perspective from which to look at the terrorist attacks. No doubt, we agree on our opposition to terrorism. But from whose point of view do we oppose it? Is it from the viewpoint of the United States, or any other country for that matter? Or is it from the perspective of humanity?

In this context, we must examine the following three points.

Firstly, the identity of the actors who wage the "war" against terrorism.

In his Congressional address on September 20, President Bush stated, "This is not just America's fight...This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight... We ask every nation to join us." A number of commentators hastily judged that this was an indication of a shift in US policy from unilateralism to multilateral internationalism. Is this an accurate reading of the American stance?

Historically, US foreign policy has been characterized by a pendulum swing between isolationism and universalistic interventionism. The former takes the view, "America by itself is the world," and the latter, "make the world American." Despite apparent contrast, the two are both sides of the same coin, namely, the thesis that "America can be equated with the world." The apparent "shift" in US policy since September 11 must be closely examined in the context of this traditional American mindset. The crux of the matter is: To what extent is the United States able to relativize itself when defining its place in the world?

President Bush insisted in the congressional address that "every nation in every region" must decide: "either you are with us (the United States) or you are with terrorists." This remark reveals yet another instance of the US's view of itself as the absolute good. Reminiscent of the US Cold War rhetoric - "the Free World vs. Communism, good vs. evil" - he frequently equates "freedom, democracy, and justice" with "America." Undoubtedly his claims are based on the tacit, or self-evident, premise that American definitions of these concepts are of universal validity.

The reason for the US call for "international cooperation" in response to terrorism this time concerns the impracticality of "unilateral" handling of matters such as intelligence, banking regulations, surveillance and detention in order to counter terrorist activities. In its reaching out for the cooperation of other nations, the United States is consistent in giving priority to the protection of US interests. Further, while a number of countries support the anti-terrorist stand for various reasons, the citizens of the United States stand out for their extreme patriotic fervor. This is yet another manifestation of the America-centric stance.

Even without the approval of the UN Security Council and without the active support of its allies, the United States doubtless would have started its "war" in the remote periphery of Afghanistan on its own (with Prime Minister Tony Blair along for the ride). This is "unilateralism" determined to execute its universal interventionism even by itself. This same unilateralism leads the US government to the notion of trying Osama bin Laden, not in an international court, but in an exclusively US military tribunal separate from the US legal system.

Yet, it must be recognized, at the same time, that history offers few examples of so many countries cooperating with the United States. How should we interpret the participation of such a large number of nations in the campaign against terrorism, Osama Bin Laden, and Al Qaida? Does it mean that there has emerged a universal consensus against terror from the viewpoint of humanity? This is the second question we must address.

There are two types of countries that take an anti-terrorist stand.

One comprises those countries, in Europe and elsewhere, where human rights and democracy are firmly consolidated.

The other includes anti-democratic, authoritarian countries which go along with anti-terrorism because they wish to suppress the active movements of ethnic minorities and political dissidents on their own soil. For instance, the Russian government confronted by Chechen independence movements and the Chinese facing a Uighur challenge normally uphold the principles of "national sovereignty" and "non-interference with domestic affairs" in opposition to US interventionism. This time, however, they willingly back US military expedition to Afghanistan, and are exceptionally in agreement on the UN Security Council.

Similarly, Afghanistan's neighbors, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, all known for being dictatorial, oppressive, and corrupt, to which the United States had taken a critical stand before September 11, nevertheless fell in with the United States because of their common fear of Islamic resistance movements. For other Middle Eastern countries, from Saudi Arabia with its rigid monarchy to Egypt with its considerably secularized republic, chiming in with the anti-terrorist rhetoric lends rationale to their oppressive practices as they ruthlessly suppress anti-regime movements. The same applies to anti-democratic regimes in other parts of the world.

Both democratic and anti-democratic countries agree as far as opposition to terrorism is concerned. Thus, it is small wonder that the US's anti-terrorism campaign has earned the support of such an overwhelmingly large number of states. For the latter type of regime, "anti-terrorism" is an indulgence for their anti-democratic transgressions.

In the end, we must ask from whose perspective do we define "terrorism" and "anti-terrorism"? Further, the "anti-terrorist grand alliance" of these disparate countries will not prevent other old or new conflicts from coming to the surface once the "war" is over, or if it is prolonged.

Another aspect of international anti-terrorism is the rhetorical manipulation which makes the concept escalate from opposition to the specific terrorist incidents of September 11 - unacceptable by any standards - to a war against terrorism in general. This quibbling is further complicated by the lack of universally accepted, clear definition of "terrorism".

This conceptual ambiguity has resulted in the two forms of problem for the United States.

First is the ambiguity shown by the United States in its stand against the measures taken by other countries to suppress the movements for national self-determination. On October 15, 2001, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice stated, "At the forthcoming APEC meeting, President Bush intends to tell the leaders of Russia, the People's Republic of China, and other Asian nations that he supports their anti-terrorism effort at home. but they must draw a line between legitimate dissent and genuine terrorism and not trample human rights." Reportedly Bush communicated this message to Chairman Jiang Zemin and other leaders. Yet, for political considerations, no specific mention was made of the bearing of this message on the fact that Russia and China aim at taking advantage of the US anti-terrorist campaign to legitimize their own oppressive policies toward ethnic separatist and independence groups such as the Chechens and the Uighurs. Further, the United States and Western Europe rejected the Arab proposal made at the United Nations to exclude movements for national self-determination and liberation from the concept of terrorism. Consequently, a new anti-terrorist treaty was stalled.

Secondly, the ambiguity of the US position was revealed by another country which turned the US campaign to its own advantage. When President Bush, in an effort to obtain the support of Islamic nations for his new war, stated on October 2 that the United States was not against the establishment of a Palestinian state, the Israeli government was infuriated, comparing the Bush administration to the appeasers in the face of Hitler, and claimed that its fight against the Palestinians was exactly the same as what the US was doing against Afghan terrorists. If Israel's assertion was correct, it would mean that the US anti-terrorist campaign was on par with Israel's problematic Palestinian policies. If Israel was wrong, then the US policy of supporting Israel was also mistaken. Paradoxically, it was the statement of Israeli government, a close ally of the United States, which insinuated that the US actions might contain elements of oppression against the struggle for self-determination. 

In short, this political game of anti-terrorism blurred, wittingly or unwittingly, the distinction between "anti-state terrorism" and "state-sponsored terrorism". It was thanks to this ambiguity in the concept of terrorism that the extensive "global alliance against terrorism" came into being, or appeared to come into being. Terrorism and anti-terrorism must, therefore, be defined in terms of specific political contexts.

It is entirely natural that American citizens should have felt extraordinary rage at the cruel terrorist attacks. However, if that anger is based on an American perspective, and if the "broad international support" backing the American anti-terrorist policies includes that of a large number of regimes that are antithetical to democracy and human rights, then it is uncertain to what extent the US stand can be considered of universal validity.

In turn, how can the United States claim that its "war" is universally justifiable?

The third question to address concerns whether the "war" the US has resorted to as a means to attain the generally justifiable goal of anti-terrorism can be considered generally justifiable.

Legal criticism has been made that the US military engagement is a violation of international law because it does not conform to Article 51 of the UN Charter which refers to "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs" and provides that "measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council..." This judgment is valid so far as a conflict between states is concerned. But a large-scale terrorist attack like the September 11 incident is of a different kind of conflict not envisaged by the UN Charter. 

Nonetheless, the United States, while claiming that this is a "new type of war," invoked the "old" conventional provision of "individual self-defense", as did its NATO allies citing the traditional concept of "collective defense" in order to legalize and legitimize their actions. Thus, neither the indictment nor defense is well-founded.

But when the Security Council resolved on September 12 that "it expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001," and when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, immediately following the commencement of US bombing in Afghanistan, indicated general approval of the US strikes in the light of the Security Council resolution and stated that there was no need for a new resolution, the debate on the legality of US actions was de facto brought to a close. In my opinion, Kofi Annan's statement condoning the American use of force set a questionable precedent for the United Nations. But his reactions served to justify the US military expedition, making the legal debate practically irrelevant.

At the same time the situation was such that, if the United States had sought official approval of its use of force, it is certain that Russia and China would have cast their votes in favor, thus strengthening the legality of US air strikes. But the United States did not seek UN official approval because that would have tied its hands in subsequent military operations. This is yet another example of American unilateralism, giving priority to a military option of its own design rather than to the question of international law.

This implies that there is an important difference between the lawful use of force based on approval from the United Nations and the international community, on the one hand, and the military course the United States has actually taken, on the other. The use of force in and of itself is not the issue. What we must question is the way military action is taken.

Four years ago, I wrote as follows, though with direct reference to "humanitarian intervention": "Heretofore, if, through a series of trials and errors, progress is made on the international acceptance of common norms and rules...it is possible that multi-national collaboration will increasingly assume the character of police action rather than military action." (Soutaika no jidai [The Age of Relativization], 1997)

In other words, as civil society cannot be maintained without police of some sort, we need an apparatus at the international level that will perform police functions. Some people questioned whether the September 11 incidents should be classified as acts of war or as crimes. Clearly, the acts were criminal in nature. But it is also clear that, in dealing with crimes, there must be an agency with coercive power able to arrest and try the suspects. If the current US policy aims at employing beyond national boundaries such coercive force in the form of "war" against the non-state actors located in a territory where no authoritative government exists and no regular legal arrangements for extradition apply, the distinction between crimes and war would not have much relevance for all practical purposes. The more pressing question concerns what are the conditions an international "police action" must meet, as distinct from conventional military actions. At least the following two conditions must be fulfilled.

The first condition is that there are laws, norms and rules based on the general consensus of the international community, and nations act in accordance with them, including acts designed to ensure their enforcement. Further, not only the goals but also the means to attain them must be in conformity with those laws, norms and rules, and each nation must bear legal accountability in the event the means employed is against the law.

How does this apply to the current US anti-terrorist activities?

One of the fundamental principles of present international law is, as provided in the UN Charter, that all nations "shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means." If this were the goal of the United States, it would have proceeded in a different manner. For example, it might have supported the tightening of the UN embargo on the transport of weapons into Afghanistan from other countries, Pakistan in particular. At the same time, the United States could have secured the consent of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to the stationing of an international protection force consisting of troops from Islamic countries so that humanitarian emergency aid to the Afghan people would be safely implemented in order to enhance popular aspiration for cease-fire and peace. In the interim, the United States could have encouraged Afghanistan's neighboring countries to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on the Taliban to turn over Osama bin Laden.

It had taken several years of negotiation before the Yugoslav government turned over Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague court. If the United States was prepared for a "long war" against terrorism, it should at least have shown its intent to engage in long term diplomatic talks to induce the Taliban to turn over Osama bin Laden. To that end, the United States could have taken advantage of many signs of rift within the Taliban forces and Pashtun warlords. Instead, it only raised the stakes by, for instance, high-handedly approving the policy of assassinating Osama bin Laden. It is doubtful that such moves can be considered wise diplomacy, conducive to a "peaceful settlement of disputes".

Secondly, while international public opinion seems to have largely accepted that US military response was unavoidable, a large number of people pose an agonizing question: How can we justify a "war" that has resulted in so many civilian fatalities and injuries? The US air strikes and troop movements have led to countless refugees, internal and international, and to difficulties in delivering relief aid that would avert starvation and death of so many Afghan civilians, including children and the aged. In what way does this differ from terrorism? No doubt, the Afghan civilian victims have outnumbered the three thousand lives lost in New York City.

If the United States claims that its military actions are legitimate and legal, then it must also take legal responsibility for civilians who have been injured or killed as "collateral damage", just as a police force does when an officer kills or injures an innocent person in the course of executing its mission. Should the United States recognize that the use of force will be justifiable only when it agrees to compensate the innocent civilian victims and to bring those responsible to justice, then it might call this a "new war", one that sets a new precedent for international law.

It may possibly be difficult to ascertain the identity of the perpetrator when a bomb strays from its target and accidentally hits civilians. Precisely for that reason, however, it will be essential to take responsibility, at least to pay compensation to the innocent victims. Even if the compensation is to be paid en bloc rather than individually, it must be made unmistakably clear that the money paid is legally accountable "compensation", not charitable "aid".

If the rules of "new war" set by George W. Bush is based on the idea that it is right to cross international borders in pursuit of terrorists and hold them accountable to the law, then, by the same token, is it not right to demand the United States pay compensation to Afghan civilian victims transnationally? And shouldn't Japan and other countries cooperating in the US military incursion also accept "burden sharing" in paying the compensation? We live in an age which is ripe for raising such questions in the name of humanity and "civilization".

So far, I have examined, in connection with the "war in Afghanistan", the problems involved in the US stand, realities of "international cooperation", and the damage incurred by the US military strikes. At the same time, it is obvious that terrorism cannot be tolerated. The fanaticism and violence of terrorists are absolutely incompatible with democracy and civil society. Yet, we must admit that complete eradication of terror is a near impossibility, just as it would be utopian to imagine that crime could be entirely done away with. The question we must address, therefore, is how to minimize the incidence of terror by changing the societies that give rise to the population sympathetic to the cause upheld by terrorists.

Many have singled out poverty as the main cause of terrorism. In my view, however, terrorism is the product of oppressive political and social structures, of which poverty is a component, and the corresponding political and social consciousness of being oppressed. These oppressive structures in today's world have three dimensions.

Firstly, the global political and military dominance of the United States and its allies and the global dominance of global capital have given rise to global disparity and oppression. Secondly, and related to this, there are domestic structures of disparity and oppression, most notably in many developing countries. Thirdly, there is the transnational structure of inequity and discrimination faced by an enormous number of people who move to more "advanced" countries in an effort to escape from the dual pressures of global and domestic domination.

Statistics compiled by the United Nations and many other organizations testify to the fact that the world we live in today constitutes a huge pyramid characterized by inhumane disparity and oppression. As information dissemination is globalized and the disadvantaged people become increasingly aware of the global inequities and inequalities, it is natural that a growing number of the marginalized should harbor anger and resentment. 

I have elsewhere commented on the likelihood of urban unrest around the world as the result of the outrage and despair of disadvantaged people under the condition of inequitable global marketization, noting that, "While the incidence of inter-state conflict and war will decrease, the ubiquitous urban unrest may possibly become a World War III in the 21st century." (Sekai, September 1998) 

Although I envisaged a world war that cuts across national boundaries, the inhumanity of the September 11 terrorist attacks went beyond anything I had ever imagined. At the same time, I felt quite uncomfortable when I heard someone characterize the terror as a "challenge against civilization" or a "war against civilized society." Of course, it is antithetical to civilization. But we must ask simultaneously: What do we mean by "civilization"? Does our "civilization" not rest upon the global structure of inequity and oppression which we ignore so long as it does not harm our vested interests?

Of the many observers and media people in Japan who have commented on terrorism, none (that I know of) has tackled it as part of our own problem, i.e. as intrinsic to our way of life called "civilization". Rather, they have treated terrorism as the subject of analysis and policy making, or as the object of military campaign. I have yet to see an account of the causes of terrorism that refers to our own mindset and the modality of our "civilization". This is what has made me deeply uncomfortable.

President Bush said in his Congressional address, "Americans are asking, why do they hate us? ...They hate our freedoms - our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other." 

I was astounded by this remark, and wondered if he truly believed that his statement would prove convincing to other peoples of the world. 

There are a number of people, particularly in the developing countries, who do not accept the means used by terrorists but find their objective and intent understandable. These people "hate" America because, while it firmly protects freedom, human rights, and democracy for itself, America has collaborated in the murder and the silencing of those in the developing countries who fight against their oppressive, corrupt regimes in pursuit of freedom, human rights, and democracy. Further, America's "global standard" is seen as having widened the gap between rich and poor and eroded the "freedom to disagree" with America in defense of one's own cultural values.

As far as its continued emulation of American "civilization" is concerned, the Japanese mindset is equally problematic.

I emphasize the need for soul searching about the nature of "civilization" because I believe we stand at a turning point in post-World War II history. A shift in the conception of war signals this change as war has often been evoked as a battle between "civilization and barbarians", between "justice and the forces of evil." I will spell out the centrality of the notions of "civilization" and "justice" as they apply to the latter half of the twentieth century.

In World War II, the Allies vanquished uncivilized Nazism and Japanese militarism in defense of civilization and justice. The subsequent Cold War led to the split of the Allied Powers' civilization and justice into two incompatible realms. In the post-Cold War phase, we tend to condemn "state socialism" in outright negative terms. But, in reality, many intellectuals and workers in the West regarded the Russian Revolution as the advent of a "new civilization", and many people in the "Third World" viewed socialism as bearing the promise of a just society. Otherwise, it would be incomprehensible why the Cold War could have lasted as long as a half century. Underlying the ideological power of state socialism was the deep rage and despair that emerged as the result of the failures of the twentieth-century capitalism and market economy, culminating in the Depression in the North and the post-independence economic dependency of the South.

The end of the Cold War led to the "triumph" of the market economy and liberal democracy and subsequently to the "New World Order" under which a single vision of civilization and justice dominated. The establishment of the New Order was exemplified by the Gulf War. Because Iraq embarked on an anachronistic "old war" by openly invading the territory of another state with its regular army, it was easy for the international community to condemn Saddam Hussein as an "uncivilized" barbarian. The multinational forces, with the virtual blessing of the United Nations, presented themselves as the fighters for "justice". The definition of justice was unequivocal, and "uncivilized" Iraq was expelled from civilized world order. 

Things changed radically with the occurrence of Yugoslavian "ethnic cleansing" and NATO bombing. Those who asserted in unison that the ethnic cleansing must not be glossed over because it was a gross violation of human rights divided on whether NATO bombing, which led to civilian casualties, i.e. another form of the infringement on human rights, was justifiable. A division emerged within civilization itself, no longer "between the civilized and the uncivilized".

On September 11, 2001, the uncivilized terrorists tore into "civilization", and the situation turned into a new phase. But the "roots of terrorism" as distinct from "terror" itself raised the question whether the western "civilization" which has so far embodied "justice" is not anti-civilizational insofar as it remains indifferent to the global structure of appalling inequity and oppression. It is in this sense that the terror is a "challenge to civilization" and the "justice" of democracies of the North is coming under question. This is why Bush's repeated insistence that "justice shall be done" and America is conducting a "just war" sounds hollow to many who doubt whether it is the right answer. Precisely because the problems are fundamentally structural, Bush must say the United States is waging an "endless war with an invisible enemy".

It is often said that the terrorists have taken advantage of democratic freedom of the North for their anti-democratic purposes. Although that is not wrong, terrorism should be considered a manifestation of the much deeper structural backlash underway on four dimensions.

Firstly, there has been the counter-flow of large numbers of immigrants and refugees from South to North, reversing the historical trend of ruling officials and labor force moving from the metropoles to colonies. By settling in the countries in the North these people, while confronting discriminatory, repressive practices, are altering the character of the national identity and national culture of the recipient countries.

Secondly, a backlash can be seen in the development of nuclear weapons by the nations in the South. Twenty years ago, I invited an African friend, for whom I have great respect, to a conference held in Japan. He argued, "It is only when we have developed nuclear weapons that we can get the First World to take seriously the poverty in the Third World and the enormous North-South disparity." When I criticized him for making this kind of inhumane remark at a conference where A-bomb survivors were present, he refused to retract his statement. I also pointed out, "It is unrealistic to assume that nuclear weapons of the South will be targeted only to the North, and it will amount to the self-denial of the justice of the South if these weapons are directed against other nations of the South." Yet, the point he made has continued to stick in my mind.

Thirdly, the backlash can take the form of terrorism using biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, which would involve a large number of civilian casualties in the North - undeniably the worst and most dreaded type of protest. Naturally, I loathe the idea of such inhumane, demonic slaughter of innocents. At the same time, I cannot help but also remember the words of despair my African friend uttered.

Finally, the world information and communication order dominated by the mass media of the North, such as CNN, BBC, AP, and Reuters, has been challenged by the recent moves in the South intended to disseminate internationally information compiled from the perspective of global peripheries, mostly using internet networks. The most dramatic example of this kind of backlash was a series of interviews with Osama bin Laden disseminated by the Qatar satellite TV, Al Jazeera. The fact that the Bush administration attempted in vain to suppress the telecast, in violation of the very principle of the "freedom of speech and press" it professedly espouses, illustrates the backlash of the free information flow, now from South to North.

The backlash on these four dimensions all speak of actions meant to render visible to the society and civilization of the North the very existence of the peoples of the South. The world is entering a phase of South-North backlash. Do our societies in the North respond to this challenge by closing ourselves or by making ourselves open to it? This is one of the fundamental questions raised by the "roots of terrorism".

The sort of stance which Japan should take toward the September 11 incidents has to be determined in this world-historical context.

Clearly, Japan's reactions to the terrorist incidents have been deeply affected by what may be called the "Gulf War syndrome". This posture stems from the "humiliation" the Japanese government felt when its monetary contribution of as large as 13 billion US dollars was not appreciated by the United States nor by Kuwait because, due to the Constitutional constraints, it did not send troops. 

In reality, however, none of Japan's neighbors in East Asia, or South Asia west of Indonesia and Malaysia, which has a significant Islamic presence, was calling at that time for a Japanese military expedition to the Gulf. Further, I heard one eminent Latin American ambassador to the United Nations say at a UN sponsored conference: "There was no need for Japan to become militarily involved. Its response was adequate." What do the Japanese government and media mean by the "international community" which, in their view, was disappointed with the lack of Japan's military contribution? Do they not tend to disregard the voices of many nations other than the United States? This US-centric worldview is not only removed from the reality but is also diplomatically counterproductive in the light of the remarkably growing weight Moslems carry in today's international community.

Of course, I appreciate the strong interest the Japanese government shows in playing an active role in promoting the peace and reconstruction of Afghanistan as it did for the implementation of the peace accords on Cambodia in the 1990s. But the situation in Afghanistan is far more complex and difficult than that of Cambodia. Afghanistan is characterized by the rivalry of diverse ethnic groups and warlords. Further, it is surrounded by not only major powers such as Russia and China, but also Iran, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, most of which countries share with Afghanistan ethnic groups residing on both sides of the borders. On top of that, a complex conflict of interest related to the oil and natural gas reserves in the Caspian Sea region is involved. These complications did not exist in the case of the Cambodian peace.

At an international academic conference held in Japan five years ago, I warned of the danger of the "Balkanization of Asia" because Asia is characterized by a wide variety or even heterogeneity in terms of traditional cultures, religions, legacies of colonialism, and the levels and modes of economic development as well as the vested interests in the energy resources located in the Caspian Sea region which is likely to be a Middle East in the 21st century. If the current international efforts fail to bring about peace and the reconstruction of Afghanistan, it will become internally "Balkanized"; and it is not inconceivable that its repercussions might reach far beyond its borders like a tidal wave. This must be avoided at all cost since the absence of peace in Central Asia will have a profound adverse effect on the Eurasian continent, including Japan. 

Japan has attached so much importance to hosting an international conference of donors for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in order to demonstrate Japan's presence before the international community through its "Rising Sun diplomacy". But the Japanese government must not trivialize the task. Instead, it should be willing to throw itself in earnest into efforts that will truly contribute to rebuilding devastated Afghanistan even if the role it plays should remain inconspicuous.

While Japanese products and the signboards of Japanese corporations have a strong presence throughout the world, Japan's diplomacy has seldom shown an active profile. This is probably the other side of the same coin shown in Prime Minister Koizumi's peculiar commitment to the active diplomacy of "showing the flag of Rising Sun" in unreserved support of the United States.

Most distressing is the sense that there is no real will to grapple with the basic problem of the "roots of terror". Instead, cabinet and the Diet dealt only with the symptoms of terrorism through the participation in the multinational military force abroad and the tightening of security control at home. The true question we must ask ourselves is whether Japan can be called a "civilized" society if we are content to ignore the reality that one out of five people on earth suffers the "subhuman survival" of poverty and hunger while we enjoy affluence. If our political system is predicated on the practice that democracy and human rights "end at the sea shore", is it not a fake democracy that runs counter to the rights of humanity?

To consider what Japan should do to tackle the root causes of terrorism, I return to the debate we had at the time of the Gulf War. I then agreed to the idea put forward by the opposition parties that, instead of dispatching troops, Japan should make a non-military contribution by establishing a corps for peace-keeping and peace-building activities broadly defined, devoted not only to the maintenance of order but also to humanitarian aid and social and economic reconstruction and development.

As the result of the bureaucratic opposition of the Defense Agency to the creation of an independent organization for peace-keeping, as well as the cooling of enthusiasm on the part of the opposition parties due to the end of the campaign, the Japanese people missed the opportunity to thoroughly examine what a non-military contribution would be like. When the September 11 terrorist incidents occurred, the Japanese government forged ahead with a "military contribution" as if to fill the vacuum left in the wake of the Gulf War experience. In a similar vein, neither the leftist opposition parties nor citizen groups that stood against both "terror and military retaliation" offered a viable alternative.

To avoid repeating Japan's wasted experience since the Gulf war, we must seriously consider what form of non-military organization we should create. In fact, we know that, in order to grapple with poverty and human rights violation in the global periphery in support of the initiatives taken by indigenous NGOs, we must extend assistance in the areas of medicine, education, environmental protection, sustainable economic development, human rights, particularly those of women and children, and so forth. In rough outline, Japan should establish a unique public organization based on cooperation and the division of labor between the government and citizens, including professionals, senior and mid-career people as well as youth. Citizens should be at the center of this national project, and the government should provide financial support but, in principle, not interfere with the decisions and activities of participating citizens. The key question is whether the government has the will to do so. 

This organization will not be an instrument of the nationalist diplomatic display of Japan's presence but a "Human Security Corps" to serve the rights and interests of humanity. If a Japanese, without waving the flag of the "Rising Sun", can earn the trust of the people of other nations, that will become an invaluable moral resource which will ultimately contribute to the national interest of Japan. If Japan will thereby persistently show its human presence at ordinary times, Japan can keep calm at times of international crisis without worrying about the need to demonstrate its national presence. With full confidence, Japan will thus find its own way to shoulder its responsibility in the world. 

In order to sustain a "Human Security Corps" that will continue to make humanitarian contributions over a long period, however, the state and society of Japan will have to transform themselves from within in at least two ways.

Firstly, we must train a large cohort skilled in many languages and knowledgeable about diverse cultures. Japan is said to have played an important role in peace-making in Cambodia; but it is questionable how many Japanese involved in that process were able to communicate with the Cambodian people in the native Khmer language. The training of people for a Human Security Corps will require a radical change of Japan's educational system, especially at the university level and in foreign language education. Curricula for lower education should include the teaching of history from the perspective of humanity, not Japan-centric national history. The media will also need to reexamine the way it reports and its underlying subconscious prejudices and oversights.

Secondly, Japan must be more open to immigrants and refugees as well as foreign students. I remember well how strange I felt when, upon my return from a stay in the United States, I looked out at the students in my class and found that they all had the same color of skin and hair (this was in the days before not a few of them began to dye their hair!). In my view, one of the sources of the vitality of American society lies in the fact that there is always a significant segment of the people which seeks to overcome the tensions generated by its multi-racial, multi-cultural structure. In contrast, Japan does not hold enough allure to make people, young people in particular, in other countries want to live and make their life's work here. Many come only for short-term employment to earn money. There are considerable obstacles, including the rigid immigration laws, which discourage foreign immigrants to Japan. Will the Japanese population lose its vitality as it turns into an aged, homogeneous Japanese nation, consisting of the self-professed "Yamato race"?

If Japan is a society which fails to attract people abroad to come and cohabit as its equal citizens, how can it nurture citizens who will go abroad and entice the local people to treat the Japanese as acceptable fellow humans? By making ourselves more multi-cultural at home, we will create a society able to prepare citizens to do a positive work in other societies of "alien" cultures.

For Japan to transform the substance of its own education, culture, and society, there is no easy path. Yet the question posed by "roots of terror" is whether or not we can so transform our own "civilization".

SEKAI, no. 697  (January 2002), translated by the original author.