"Nuts and a Bunch of Wimps"

  Another historical coincidence is the fact that this year marks the fiftieth anniversary since the signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Admittedly, no direct historical link exists between that anniversary and the Ehime-maru collision. Even so, it is possible to detect the "lightness" of the Japan-US alliance-at least from the US point of view--both in the rescue activities that immediately followed the accident and in the US military's handling of the bereaved families of the victims who came to visit the site. One suspects that the US Navy and the government might have reacted differently had the vessel been, for example, a French fishing training vessel, rather than a Japanese one.

After the defeat in the Pacific War, and even after the end of the Allied Occupation, Japan has been shaped by the Occupation and by the two US-Japan Security Treaties. September, 2001, will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the initial security treaty in 1951, which accompanied the peace treaty. In 1960, the Security Treaty (AMPO) was renewed, and US-Japan relations were declared to be that of two equal partners. However, former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski, in his book Grand Chessboard, clearly articulated America's actual viewpoint when he stated that AMPO in reality defines Japan as a protectorate of the United States--and thus not as an equal.

By the same token, the Japanese reaction to the US attitude could hardly be called resolute. Former Prime Minister MORI Yoshiro exemplifies this lack of seriousness in his failure to leave the golf course where he was playing even after hearing news of the incident, and further by continuing to play his game for two full hours after having been informed. Had a similar situation occurred involving China, Russia, or North Korea, the Japanese government would have undoubtedly made its fury known in no uncertain terms.

The US's posture toward Japan also has been made clear recently by a series of incidents involving the US military based in Japan:
    ・ In an e-mail he wrote to lower ranking officers, which was disclosed on February 6, 2001, the head of the US Marines in Okinawa, Lt. General Earl Hailston called Okinawan Governer INAMINE Keiichi and Mayor YOSHIDA Katsuhiro of Kincho and other local politicians "nuts" and "a bunch of wimps." Inamine, Yoshida and other local politicians had been demanding reduction of the US marine corps stationed in Okinawa. 
    ・ On February 9, at Hijiudai Shooting Grounds in Oita Prefecture, US soldiers who were demonstrating shooting practice to 67 local citizens had 3 of the visitors fire the 155 mm howitzers with live ammunition, despite the fact that Japanese law forbids Japanese from possessing or using guns or other such weapons. 
    ・ In Chatan-cho, Okinawa Prefecture, the US military refused to hand over a GI for whom an arrest warrant had been issued. The service man in question was accused of arson at a local restaurant. The suspect was not turned in to the Japanese authorities until he was formally indicted on February 13.
    ・ In another incident in Chatan-cho, an intoxicated Green Beret was arrested on the spot on February 17, for the damage he caused by climbing atop of police and other vehicles.

 Perhaps it is mere coincidence that these incidents occurred over such a short time period and so close to the Ehime-maru incident. However, again, the sloppy and insensitive behavior of US military personnel stationed in Japan reflects another aspect of the fragility and lightness of US-Japan relations. This laxness of the US attitude must not be overlooked, though, especially in light of the need to prevent future incident like the Ehime-maru. Notably, many Los Angeles-class submarines of the same type as the Greeneville frequently put into port in Japan--notably Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Katsuren-cho in Okinawa. In 1998, US nuclear subs entered Japanese ports 55 times, in 1999, 41 times, and in 2000, 51 times. That is an average of one submarine a week. In February after the Ehime-maru incident, US nuclear submarines entered the port of Yokosuka on February 12, and Okinawa on February 19.

From this we can conclude that it would not come as a surprise should a similar collision occur in Tokyo Bay or Sasebo. The Hijiudai shooting range incident suggests the same laxness and carelessness about Japanese law. Another accident may well happen in the seas around Japan or near the bases, as long as the US military thinks it "appropriate" to have civilian guests aboard an nuclear attack submarine and to demonstrate surfacing maneuvers to them (as Thomas B. Fargo, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet insisted). 

By the same token, the Japanese people have not heard their own government demand that the US exercise caution against such things happening again. All we see, on this fiftieth anniversary of the US-Japan security arrangement, is continuing evidence of dependency and laxness. 

Where Does Japan Stand? 

The third wound is still gaping and unhealed. During the investigations of the Ehime-maru incident, it will doubtless come to light. Twenty years ago, on April 9, 1981, the nuclear submarine USS George Washington collided with and sunk a Japanese freighter, the Nissho-maru, in open waters off Koshiki-jima, Kagoshima Prefecture. As in the Ehime-maru incident, the George Washington damaged the Japanese vessel when it was surfacing. Furthermore, rather than attend to the Japanese crew's safety, the submarine's commander chose to tend to the nuclear missiles on board his own vessel and  not to risk publicity that a US ship was introducing nuclear weapons into Japanese waters. The George Washington, in other words, committed a hit-and-run accident. Thirteen of the Japanese crew members were adrift in the ocean for 18 hours before anyone came to their rescue. The ship's captain and one of his officers perished in the collision. Thirty five hours passed before the US government informed the Government of Japan about the incident.

Clearly, the submarine was at fault. According to the US military's own detailed investigation, the George Washington's sonar equipment had detected the sound of the Nissho-maru's engine four minutes before the collision occurred, but the submarine's officer in charge was not notified of the presence of the Japanese vessel. The George Washington furthermore neglected to attempt rescue of the Nissho-maru crew. The report concludes that the officer in charge could easily have spotted the ship had he bothered, and it criticized the behavior of the commander and other submariners as "negligent," "reckless," "slap-happy," and their training "substandard."

Nonetheless, the commander and crew were only given a "warning" as a result, and not brought up for court-martial. The Ehime-maru case may well end with similar results. Even if the crew members are charged in a formal military court, one suspects that a verdict of not guilty will be the outcome, as was the case in 1998 when US Air Force pilots were charged with the deaths of 20 people after their plane severed a cable on a ski gondola in the Italian Alps. Military law aims at maintaining discipline in times of war, rather than reflecting civilian morality in peacetime.

How Should  Japan Respond? 

The Ehime-maru incident has brought back memories of these other occurrences in Okinawa, Koshiki-jima, Hijiudai. Clearly, these constitute more than a series of random accidents. They are much more significant than that, because they bring into question Japan's position in the US-Japan alliance. Judging from the indications in the aftermath of the Ehime-maru incident, it is likely that the US will handle the affair outside of military court. Even if the case does go before military court, the most severe punishment that will probably result is stripping the commander of his rank, and military discharge. This certainly would not seem adequate in the eyes of the families of the Ehime victims.

There are at least three appropriate responses on the part of the Japanese government. First, the Japanese government could ask that the case be tried in civil court on the charge of involuntary manslaughter, rather than in military court, because of the involvement of civilians on the Greeneville. Second, the remains of the Ehime-maru and its missing crew should be raised from the ocean floor as part of compensation to the families of the victims. Lastly, the Japanese government must work with the US government to ensure that no such incidents happen again on bases in Okinawa or on the Japanese mainland and in surrounding waters.

SEKAI, vol. 686 (April 2001).