I had never given up the hope for unification of Germany, but I never believed that it would happen in my own lifetime.     

Richard von Weizsacker, former President of Germany  

I thought I would never be able to step on North Korean soil in my life.  

Kim Dae Jung, President of the Republic of Korea   

The “sunshine policy”: taking a risk for peace

The North-South summit held in June 2000 was a historic event which marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula. There are likely to be clashes and setbacks over specific issues in the future, but this need not be a cause for alarm as far as the basic agreements reached at the summit meeting are concerned.  

What is most significant here is that this historic turn toward tension reduction was brought about by a series of political initiatives; initiatives rooted in the courageous decision and creative vision of a leader committed to peace and reconciliation, fully accountable to his people. Just as in the case of the “Ostpolitik” of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, which contributed to the East-West detente, and the “diplomacy of new thinking” of Mikhail Gorbachev, then the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist party, which led to the end of the Cold War, a set of political  initiatives made the “impossible” possible, giving birth to the meeting of the two Korean leaders.

First of all, it was the "sunshine policy" pursued by South Korea's President Kim Dae Jung which facilitated a change in North Korea's reactions. President Kim’s initiative was taken with great perseverance, while putting his own political fortune at stake.

This brings to mind his visit to Japan in October 1998. For his predecessors, the most sensitive question at hand when making a state visit to Japan was how to ensure a commitment in advance that the Japanese government would express its sincere official apology for the repressive colonial domination. President Kim, however, made it clear that this was a question for the Japanese to resolve on their own, and decided to refrain from setting any preconditions regarding this issue prior to his visit. To do so without clear knowledge of Japan's reaction was a risk for him, in terms not only of foreign policy but also of domestic politics where public opinion was distrustful of Japan. Through this unilateral initiative, however, he succeeded in winning the cooperative response of the Japanese government and elevated bilateral relations to a new level of mutual understanding and collaboration.

With respect to North Korea, President Kim continued to provide food and fertilizer aid and encouraged private companies to invest in the DPRK, resisting domestic critics who claimed such actions would only benefit the North. On March 9, 2000, President Kim proposed in his "Berlin Declaration" that the South Korean government would help build the North's infrastructure, including highways, ports, railroads, power plants and communications facilities. These initiatives no doubt enabled the North to accept top-level talks with the South.

It is true that providing economic assistance to North Korea has  strategic implications, given its severe economic predicament. But a country in serious economic need does not necessarily opt for a diplomatic policy which gives priority to economic considerations. This was clearly the case with North Korea in the 1990's. Suffering from prolonged famine and lacking aid from the former Soviet Union, the DPRK built up its military power for the defense of this economically troubled country. Internationally, the leadership felt the need to defend the isolated communist country from hostile powers.  Domestically, Kim Jong Il seemed to be in need of the support of the military to consolidate his newly inherited power.

One of the focal points of the "sunshine policy" was to prevent the North from becoming a militarized state that was closed precisely because of its impoverishment, and induce it to change its stance into a more open nation with a priority given to economic development.

Yet, it is extremely difficult to gather accurate information on the power structure of North Korea. In my paper titled, “Envisioning the End of the Korean Cold War,” presented at a conference organized by the Korea Christian Academy in 1999, I tried to suggest what the United States, South Korea and Japan could do externally in order to promote détente even in the absence of reliable information on the internal power structure of North Korea. Despite this constraint, it was not difficult for me to take note of the following developments.

First, Secretary General Kim Jong Il waited until September 1998, after an unusually long mourning period, to amend the constitution and become Chairman of the National Defense Commission. It would appear that Kim Jong Il, who has no military credentials, needed that much time to secure his authority over the military.

Second, in 1999, he gradually began to shift the focus of his "on-the-spot instructions" from military units to farms and factories, suggesting an increasing emphasis on the economy.

Third, in a 1995 article, Kim Jong Il expressed a strongly critical view on the failures of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as the economic reforms pursued by China and Vietnam. More recently, however, he has begun to tone down his criticism of China, and in March 1999, made public an unprecedented visit to the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang. Therefore, his visit to China in May 2000, did not come as a surprise to me, nor did his support of China’s economic reform.

Rather, what did prove to be a more interesting sign of change was the way in which China, taking an initiative as an active intermediary, promptly made his visit known to the United States, South Korea and Japan, supposedly with his approval.

Taking these undercurrents into consideration, Kim Dae Jung continued to take the initiative with his "sunshine policy", and North Korea, in turn, responded through a turnabout by Kim Jong Il. The North-South summit meeting was what lay at the merging point of these two extraordinary decisions made by two leaders: President Kim, motivated by his conviction that the Korean people should never again engage in fratricide, and Chairman Kim, struggling for the survival of his regime and his country.

One other initiative which needs to be considered here is the so-called "Perry process" undertaken by the US government. In May 1999, former US Defense Secretary William Perry, as part of his mission to advise President Clinton on the US policy toward North Korea which the United States regarded as a “rogue state”, made an unprecedentedly high-level, but rather quiet and even field-research-style, visit to Pyongyang.

Upon his return, Perry commented that he appreciated the warm hospitality extended by the DPRK government which showed a willingness to continue dialogue with the United States. It seems that his visit had been worthwhile, as it enabled him to understand what the other side was thinking. It is probable that the North Koreans also welcomed the visit, and were given an opportunity to understand what the United States was thinking. Thus, Perry initiated dialogue between the two governments on a higher level, based on the idea that the United States should recognize the viability of the North Korean regime. Along these lines, the United States responded with an easing of economic sanctions when North Korea indicated on June 19, 2000, that it would continue to freeze its missile tests.

As we have seen, the initiatives taken by the two Koreas, China and the United States, paved the way for the North-South summit and détente on the Korean Peninsula. By now, it should be clear that there is one actor missing here: Japan.