[Editor's Note]

The contest over national identity and symbols in Japan entered a new phase with the election on 28 April 2001 of KOIZUMI Junichiro as President of the LDP, and, given the LDP'S preponderance of seats in the Diet, therefore Prime Minister. Touted as a 'reformer', Koizumi took office declaring his support for constitutional revision, as a longer-term goal, to allow Japan to possess regular armed forces (in effect abolishing the restraints of Article 9) and arguing that 'due respect' should be paid to those who 'lay down their lives for their country' in times of crisis (in effect calling for the reinstatement of Yasukuni as a national shrine). 

Not only Koizumi but all four candidates in the April LDP election pledged themselves if elected to make 'official obeisance visits' to Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August. 

The following article, written before Koizumi took office, provides background information and analyses the significance of the shrine issue.'

The "Yasukuni Problem" raises in sharp form the question of Japan's sense of war responsibility and postwar responsibility for colonialism and aggressive war. The problem has persisted on the political and social level throughout the postwar era. 

What does Yasukuni Shrine Mean?

Yasukuni Shrine, a Shintoist religious body corporate, is the shrine where the soldiers and civilian employees of the military who died in modern Japan's wars have been enshrined as 'heroic spirits'. It was administered by the army and navy up until the time of defeat in the war. From the Sino-Japanese War to the Asia-Pacific War the noblest virtue was to die in battle for the emperor, be enshrined as a god at Yasukuni Shrine, and be the recipient of the emperor's visits. Yasukuni Shrine was a religious and military facility indispensable for the prosecution of aggressive war. State Shinto compelled not only the people of Japan itself but also people of occupied territories such as Korea to participate in worship at the shrine. Japan's religious minorities were subjected to harsh coercion and repression in the process. It was reflection on this that led to the separation of religion and politics being spelled out in the present constitution, and throughout the post-war period Yasukuni Shrine has been a religious body corporate. 

A draft Yasukuni Shrine Law, designed to place Yasukuni Shrine under state protection as before the war, was first presented as an LDP Dietmember's bill in June 1969. For a religious facility beautifying those who died in an aggressive war to be given the protection of the state would amount to an affirmation of aggressive war. And the danger of repeating the history of oppression of minorities would be high if state support were to be given to a particular shrine. It would also be in breach of the provisions of the constitution. The movement of opposition grew, and on all five occasions that this bill was presented up until 1974 it was defeated. 

The LDP and groups intent upon state protection at this point therefore changed tactics and adopted a 'bypass mode' designed to accomplish de facto state protection by accumulating 'official obeisance visits' by the emperor, prime minister and members of cabinet. In 1975 Prime Minister MIKI Takeo was the first to offer obeisance at the shrine on 15 August, but he stressed on that occasion that he did so 'as a private person'. Thereafter the question of whether or not to undertake 'official obeisance visits' became the kernel of the 'Yasukuni Problem' issue.

On 15 August 1985, Prime Minister NAKASONE Yasuhiro, dismissing domestic and foreign criticism, for the first time pressed ahead to make an 'official obeisance visit'. Because of strong protests from China in particular over the fact that fourteen of those held by the Tokyo International Military Tribunal for the Far East (The Tokyo Tribunal) to be 'A' class war criminals, including TOJO Hideki, were enshrined there (since October 1978), the practice was stopped the following year, and no 'official Prime Ministerial obeisance visit' has been made since then.

However, it was Prime Minister Nakasone's official obeisance visit that led religious figures and citizens in various places throughout Japan to launch 'Yasukuni suits' in the courts. In the 'Iwate Yasukuni Suit' the Sendai High Court in January 1991 issued and then confirmed a judgement that 'official obeisance visits' by the Prime Minister were unconstitutional, and in April 1997 the full bench of the Supreme Court delivered a ruling of unconstitutionality in the Ehime Tamagushiryo suit, holding for the first time the obvious fact that Yasukuni Shrine and the various related Gokoku Shrines were indisputably religious bodies under the constitution, thus plainly rejecting the argument which had been persisted in from Meiji times that 'Shinto is not a religion'. It also held that the state, (including local public bodies), was forbidden to have any special relationship with prescribed religious bodies, even when the matter was one of 'consoling the spirits' of those deceased in war. 

The 'Yasukuni Problem', in so far as it concerned the matter of whether or not the state could be connected to Yasukuni Shrine where the war dead are commemorated, was completely settled at the judicial level by this judgement. 

The Politics of the Yasukuni Problem

However, as a political problem the Yasukuni Problem remains unresolved. State involvement in Yasukuni Shrine would be possible under the present constitution if the character of the shrine were changed, and there is also the possibility of trying to escape international criticism by consigning the 'A-class war criminals' to a separate shrine. Ways to do this have been sought since 1986, and it has become a prominent view in LDP and government circles. 

During the 145th regular session of the National Diet in 1999, as the 'US-Japan Defense Guidelines'-related legislation, the Communications Intercept (Eavesdropping) Law, the National Flag and Anthem Law, the Revised Resident Registration Law and other bills designed to turn Japan into a country able to fight a war, were being passed, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, NONAKA Hiromu, made a statement about Yasukuni Shrine coming under state protection. This reopened the 'Yasukuni Problem'. 

Nonaka proposed that Yasukuni Shrine be made a 'special corporation' and the A-class war criminals be separately enshrined. If this were done, the two problems - of a receptacle for the new dead that could be expected from combat operations under the New Guidelines system, and of how to deal with the dead of previous wars - could be settled at a stroke. However, the question of how religions should be organized is not one that should brook political interference. The Nonaka proposal ran into difficulties when it was opposed by public opinion, especially from Buddhist, Christian and other religious figures; it looked as though the 'Yasukuni Problem' was stalemated.

However, the idea of 'official obeisance visits' was brought up among policy measures at the January 2000 LDP Congress, and at the 14 March General Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors, with the response by then Chief Cabinet Secretary AOKI Mikio that ''official shrine obeisance visits are constitutional' and strong representations by representatives in favour of 'official obeisance visits', the 'Yasukuni Problem' resurfaced. 

In the lead-up to 15 August 2000, the last 'War Defeat Day' for the twentieth century, the 'Yasukuni Problem' once again came to the fore as a major issue. Because of the statement Prime Minister MORI Yoshiro had made shortly after assuming office, in which he embraced the central principle of state Shintoism about Japan being 'a country of the gods centred on the emperor', attention focussed on whether he would make 'official obeisance visit' to Yasukuni on 15 August. However on 14 July, at a meeting with journalists accredited to the cabinet, Mori adopted a circumspect stance.

In Kyoto in early July a two-day conference was conducted by activist monks from the Otani sect of Shinshu (Eastern Honganji Temple) and the Pure Land Honganji sect of Shinshu (Western Honganji Temple) on the theme of '2000: Joint Action of East and West Honganji for Non-War and Peace'. Declaring their firm resolve of 'Never Give In', a total of 300 of them took part in demonstrations, wearing their monk's robes, and in symposia and other activities. It was the first time since Shinshu Buddhism split into Eastern and Western factions four hundred years ago for there to be any such joint activity, and for them to join hands for 'Non-War and Peace' was absolutely epochal. 

Furthermore, concern over this re-ignited 'Yasukuni Problem' was high at the 13th 'All-Japan Liaison Meeting' of religious figures, citizens and lawyers engaged in various court battles demanding separation of politics and religion, held in Osaka in late July. 

Under pressure from these two 'Anti-Yasukuni' moves, on 10 July 2000, the Japan Association of Bereaved Families opened their 'All-Japan General Meeting of War-Bereaved Families Gathered to Express their Resolve' at Kudan Hall in Tokyo under the slogan of 'We Can Wait No Longer - Let This be the Year when the Prime Minister makes Official Obeisance at Yasukuni'. From his seat at the conference, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka suggested that the path to bringing Yasukuni Shrine under state protection would be by 'Separate Enshrinement for "A-Class War Criminals', and at a subsequent press conference he spoke about turning Yasukuni Shrine into a special corporate body, repeating the general tenor of his statement in the previous year.

Nonaka's two statements were the occasion for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s Executive Committee at its 11 July meeting to decide to set up a 'Yasukuni Shrine Problem Discussion Group'. Headed by Nonaka, it had ten members, including two vice-presidents of the Bereaved Families Association and seven members from the Discussion Group of the Diet members' Shinto Politics League (for the complete list of members of this League see the 26 May issue of Shukan Kinyobi). This Discussion Group planned to prepare a unified opinion before the end of the year, but the task was carried over to 2001. 

There are three problems to account for why the 'Yasukuni Problem' thus evades settlement at either political or social level. First is the idea that 'Shinto is not a religion', or not a religion as set out in the constitution. It is a view which strongly persists. Second is the view that 'consolation of the spirits of those who died in war is a customary ritual'. Third is the sense, linked to nationalism, that it is natural for the state to deal with, or to honour, those who have died in war, in other words, 'naturally the state enshrines (consoles the spirits of, mourns for) those who die in war for the country'. It is especially this third of these that I believe is the crux of the 'Yasukuni Problem'. The question is, could the praises of the war dead be sung if there were some institution of a non-religious character to look after the war dead?. The late KAJIYAMA Seiroku, a former Chief Cabinet Secretary, has already called for a new facility distinct from Yasukuni (Asahi Shinbun, 15 August 1999, morning edition).

At least it can be said that most of those who died at war died a meaningless and absurd death, their desire to go on living being cruelly crushed. The greatest wish of those who survive is that the state vow not to let this happen again, and that it apologize and repent over its aggressive war. The point that is ultimately at issue is whether, instead of doing this, it is alright for the state to praise the dead as 'heroes' and reproduce countrymen who will follow in their footsteps. 

Governor Ishihara's Chauvinism-- 'Twisted minds are incapable of feeling' --

  In 2000 Prime Minister Mori postponed his 15 August 'official shrine obeisance visit'. However, Tokyo Governor ISHIHARA Shintaro became the first Tokyo Governor to make a 'shrine obeisance visit' in his official capacity. The possibility of an 'official shrine obeisance visit' was anticipated before the event. This becomes clear just from glancing briefly through Governor Ishihara's statements about 'official shrine obeisance visit' during the preceding year. 'When 15 August comes, if I am asked by bereaved families, and if I can be of service and make people happy, I will gladly take part and I will do so as Governor of Tokyo' (applause). (Governor Ishihara at the plenary session of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, 22 September 1999, in response to question from LDP member KOGA Toshiaki).

At a press conference a year later, on 11 August 2000, declaring that he would make 'official obeisance visit' to Yasukuni Shrine as Governor on 15 August, he said: 'My relatives and my wife's father are there. If it would give even some small comfort to the bereaved families and the spirits of the heroic dead, I would go.' As for the question of making official obeisance visit or making a private visit, 'I think the time for making such ridiculous distinctions has passed. On my own judgement, I will make an official obeisance visit as Tokyo Governor Ishihara (Asahi Shinbun, 12 August, morning issue).

Then four days later, immediately after making the official obeisance visit, he had said in advance he would make, he said: 'What is wrong with coming here in my capacity as a public official? Public officials too have freedom of religion and basic human rights. According to information sources of the municipal government, eighty per cent of people support me, and twenty per cent are opposed. That is the way things are out in the world. There are of course a few people who have twisted minds.' (Tokyo Shinbun, morning edition, 16 August)

One can see in this how Governor Ishihara's high-handed attitude towards the 'official shrine obeisance visit' was gradually exposed. Those who opposed his 'official shrine obeisance visit' come in the end to be treated as 'people with twisted minds'. Governor Ishihara's chauvinism had already been made plain by his 'sangokujin' [third country people] statement (see Tessa MORRIS-SUZUKI's article on this home page), but this time he showed his exclusionist attitude towards minorities. The question of 'official shrine obeisance visit' is not one to be settled by numbers for and against. What is at issue is whether as a public official he recognizes the fact that the constitutional prescription of freedom of religion and the principle of separation of politics and religion were adopted in response to the harsh history of oppression and exclusion of minorities under state Shinto.

Court's Rulings of Unconstitutionality

At this point the judicial view, as stated above in the judgement of the Sendai High Court in the Iwate Yasukuni Suit, that it is unconstitutional for a public official to make a formal obeisance visit to Yasukuni, has to be restated. In this case (decision of 23 September 1991), in a civil suit launched by local residents the Sendai High Court held that it was a breach of the constitutional principle of separation of church and state for the Iwate Prefectural Assembly to vote for the emperor or Prime Minister to make an official visitation to Yasukuni Shrine. In the course of the judgement, the court ruled as follows: `The judgement is inescapable that the religious relationship between the state and a religious body corporate implied by an official obeisance visit [by the emperor and Prime Minister to Yasukuni Shrine] would exceed the bounds of appropriateness under the constitutionally-prescribed principle of separation of politics and religion. Accordingly, we must hold such official obeisance visits unconstitutional as religious activity forbidden under Article 20 (3) of the constitution.'

This judicial ruling is clear, but the judgement of the full bench of the Supreme Court in the Ehime Tamagushiryo case on 2 April 1997 has a further important bearing on it:
'Even if significant numbers of people were to desire [actions designed to console the "heroic spirits" of those deceased in war] any relationship between local public bodies and a specific religion to that end must be held to be beyond the prescribed limits and to be inadmissible under the constitution.'

On a straightforward reading of these two judgements, any politician who respects judicial rulings, and on whom such an obligation is anyway required by the constitution (Article 99), to the extent that his mind is not completely twisted, cannot resort to quibbles about 'the freedom of religion enjoyed by public figures', much less engage in any 'official obeisance visit'. This must be so however much he might hate the present constitution.

Epilogue

One other dimension that is missing in Governor Ishihara's formal visitation to Yasukuni Shrine on this occasion is the capacity to imagine feelings different from his own on the part of the war dead and their bereaved families, let alone the victimized Asian peoples. 

OGURI Takeko, 81 years of age, who lost her husband in the war of aggression in China shortly after they were married, used to visit Yasukuni shrine every year without fail but in 1965 suddenly stopped because of the doubts that welled up within her about the state's use of language designed to glorify the 'heroic spirits' and the 'Yasukuni wives'. In the year that she set Yasukuni behind her, Ms Oguri composed a poem:

'Over twenty years I learned
The emptiness of the words - 
Yasukuni Wife.'

Also, in the words of FURUKAWA Yoshiko, 73 years of age, a member of a bereaved family who lost her two elder brothers in the war of aggression, 'My late mother and father never had any sense of their children being in Yasukuni Shrine'. When her mother felt sad, she would go to the riverbank and repeatedly call her brothers by name in a loud voice. And so Ms Furukawa said: 'I refuse to go to Yasukuni'.

These might be a minority. However, in a multicultural society, the most important quality, one that is demanded above all else of a politician, is the capacity to reach out imaginatively to minorities. As Pierre SAUVAGE wrote, ' Each and every one of us, at some point, is bound to become a minority.'

It goes without saying that politicians who do not care about the dissenting war victims at home are insensitive to the strong feelings of Asian peoples against the recurrent Japanese nationalist attempt to officially reinstate Yasukuni Shrine. 

The "Yasukuni Problem", a thorn deep in the flesh of post-war society, has now been carried forward intact into the twenty-first century as a problem. However, the path that Japan once chose, when it vowed 'never again', is one that demands a parting of the ways with the idea of special facilities for singing the praises of the Japanese war dead.

SEKAI, vol. 679 and 680 (September and October 2000), translated by Gavan McCORMACK .